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ABSTRACT**: Theory suggests that a united charity helps to
economize on fundraising costs by reducing competition for
donations among member charities. However, donors often
cannot control the allocation of their donations, and charities
may dislike the monitoring of their activities. This paper
examines these and other issues relating to the Community
Chest of Singapore. The results, based on analysis of financial
positions and fundraising costs of a large number of charities,
suggest that the Community Chest does possess important
fundraising advantages. Thus charities in financial difficulties
or in need of funds for additional programs tend to seek
membership. However, organizations that value their autonomy
and independence, and that are able to achieve low fundraising
costs tend to remain as non-members. Thus a monopoly agency
raising funds for all charities in the future is unlikely in the
case of Singapore.
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1 Introduction
Even in affluent economies, there are disadvantaged groups –
for example, the disabled, the aged-sick and the destitute who lack the
means to satisfy their basic needs, and need to be taken care of by the
rest of society. Singapore is no exception and while the government
plays an important and indispensable role in caring for these groups,
it does not believe in a welfare state or massive transfers to the poor.
Instead, it actively encourages voluntary welfare organizations
(VWOs) and community groups to play the major role in caring for
the needy whilst providing logistical support and encouraging private
giving. As in many developed countries, the tax deductibility of
charitable donations has been an important policy aimed at encour-
aging donations. In this connection, the Institution of Public Character
(IPC) status is granted by the Inland Revenue Department to non-
profit organizations providing social, educational and even cultural
services, and donations to them are tax-deductible. Recently, the gov-
ernment has sometimes given matching grants for private donations.
The Singapore Council of Social Service, recently renamed the
National Council of Social Service (NCSS), was set up in 1958 with a
view to coordinating and supporting the efforts of the VWOs. In 1983,
it established the Community Chest of Singapore, a centralized fund-
raising body to raise funds for its member organizations, relieving
member organizations of this onerous function and freeing up valu-
able resources for member organizations to devote to service provision.
Until 1992, the Community Chest was also responsible for allocating
funds to its members. In this respect, it functioned in a way not unlike
the United Way. Since that year, however, the task of fund allocation
was devolved to the Services Development Division of the NCSS.
At present, the Community Chest raises about 40 million
dollars annually for its members.1 All donations to the Community
Chest are tax-deductible, though not all its members have the IPC
status. An individual wishing to donate to a specific member organ-
ization can do so directly, or alternatively donate to the Community
Chest and earmark it for that agency. Members of the Community
Chest are generally not allowed to have independent fundraising
activities, except for special fundraising events. As in the case of the
United Way, working individuals can contribute to the Community
1 Throughout this paper, all values are expressed in Singapore dollars.
One US dollar is approximately equal to 1.75 Singapore dollars at the time of
writing.
434 VINCENT C.H. CHUA & CHUNG MING WONG
#CIRIEC 2003
Chest by way of a payroll deduction through participation in its
SHARE (Social Help and Assistance Raised by Employees) program,
a program launched in 1984. At present the SHARE Program is the
mainstay of the Community Chest’s fundraising efforts and accounts
for about 40 per cent of the funds raised for 50 member charities.
Undeniably, the NCSS and the Community Chest have been
very successful in furthering the cause of social service provision in
Singapore. In recent years, however, a number of concerns have
emerged. With an aging population, needs are anticipated to rise
significantly over time raising the issue as to how future funding
requirements can be met, both for the Community Chest as well as
for VWOs that are currently not members of the Community Chest.
Increased donor sophistication has also led to a demand for greater
transparency and accountability in the use of donated funds. For
instance, they want to be certain that their donations have not been
wasted on high administration costs and publicity. There is also the
common misperception that the Community Chest is, in effect, a
governmental agency or that it does not have a funding problem and
thus more donations are not needed.
In view of these and related concerns, this paper attempts to
address the following issues. What can be done to increase the volume
of donations? Would more organizations join the Community Chest,
and if they do, what may be the effect on total donations to charity?
An important, and related question is: how would the charity market
evolve in the future? Would the Community Chest become some kind
of monopoly fundraising body for all charities, or would a significant
number of agencies remain as non-members? To answer these ques-
tions, we need to do the following. First, on the donors’ side, we need
to understand what factors determine their decisions to give, and how
membership in a united charity (like the Community Chest) might
affect donations. Second, from the point of view of the charities, we
need to understand what factors determine their decision to join the
Community Chest. These issues will be discussed in the next two
sections. In Section 4, we provide empirical support for our analysis
using data and information from the agencies. Some policy implica-
tions of our study are discussed in the final section.
2 Individual charitable giving and role of united charities
In order to design measures to encourage donations, one must
first understand the factors determining an individual’s decision to
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give. One type of model attempts to explain altruistic behavior in
terms of interdependence of individual utility functions. If an
individual values not only his own consumption but also that of his
neighbor, it would be perfectly rational for him to make charitable
contributions. In Clotfelter (1985), individuals are regarded as valuing
their own consumption and charitable contributions as two goods, and
to maximize utility subject to a tax-defined budget constraint. Within
this framework, allowing tax-deductibility of charitable contributions
has an income effect and a substitution effect. First, tax-deductibility
raises the individual’s disposable income and tends to encourage
giving. Second, it lowers the price of giving. This is because if the
marginal tax rate facing the individual is t, the price of giving a dollar,
in terms of foregone personal consumption or saving when deduct-
ibility is allowed, is only 1 t. Most empirical studies found charitable
giving to be elastic with respect to the tax price but income elasticity is
typically below unity.2 Chua and Wong (1999) obtained similar results
for the case of Singapore, and concluded from the high estimates of
tax price elasticity that tax incentives can provide a strong stimulus to
charitable giving.
Since in these models individuals donate to increase the supply
of a public good (the charitable output), two additional considerations
become relevant. First, as a result of the inability of individual donors
to coordinate their activities in a voluntary contribution setting, the
well-known free-rider problem comes into play. However, Andreoni
(1988), citing evidence from the American economy, suggests that this
may be inconsistent with the empirical realities. Second, an increase
in government expenditure on social services or government grants
will lead to a reduction of private donations. In fact, Warr (1982) and
Roberts (1984) showed that, under certain assumptions, a dollar-for-
dollar crowding-out might occur. Again, empirical studies by Abrams
and Schmitz (1978, 1984), Steinberg (1991), Weinblatt (1992) and
others found only evidence of partial crowding-out and in some cases
the magnitudes are rather small. Andreoni (1989, 1990) argued that
this implies that the simple model outlined above may not be entirely
satisfactory, and that there may be other motives for giving. Weisbrod
(1988) also noted that in certain cases government spending would in
fact encourage private donations if donors see this as a signal that
certain activities are worthy of private support.
2 The studies are too numerous to be cited in full here, but some of these
results have been summarized in Clotfelter (1985) and Weisbrod (1988).
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Despite its shortcomings, the model just described underlies the
vast majority of empirical work on the determinants of the level of
charitable giving by individuals. This model, however, does not
explain how characteristics of the recipient organizations may
influence the donors’ distribution of their gifts among various char-
ities. As Schiff (1990), Rose-Ackerman (1980) and others have pointed
out, the main problem faced by donors is that of poor information
about the charities. Donors give to charities but they themselves do
not ultimately consume the output. Due to this problem of
asymmetric information, donors are uncertain about the marginal
impact of their donations on charitable output and this tends to
deter giving. In this situation, donations will be higher, the more
efficient is the charity in using its donations to provide charitable
output, and the more certain are donors about such efficiency.
An important way for a charity to provide information about
itself is through fundraising activities. In Weisbrod and Dominguez
(1986) and Posnett and Sandler (1989), nonprofit firms are viewed as
supplying both public and mixed goods. As in the case of private
goods, the demand for the output of nonprofit firms depends on
conventional market variables such as advertising, price and quality.
Thus fundraising activities serve the same function as advertising in
the case of private goods in providing information to potential donors.
They also argued that donors are interested not in contributing a
dollar’s worth of money, but rather a dollar of charitable output.
Thus what is crucial is the efficiency of the organization in converting
donations into final services rather than into administration and
fundraising costs. As shown by Posnett and Sandler (1989), the price
of donating an extra dollar’s worth of output to a particular charity is
1/[1 (fþ a)], where f and a are the proportions of total expenditure
devoted to fundraising and administration. If donations to the charity
are tax-deductible, the price is (1 t)/[1 (fþ a)]. Within this frame-
work, fundraisingactivitieshave twoeffects. First, fundraisingprovides
information to the donors and tends to increase donations. Second,
more fundraising raises f and thus the price of giving, and this tends
to offset the first effect. In these studies, the authors found donations
to be responsive to the price of giving (as just defined), fundraising
expenditure and other variables. Later studies by Khanna et al. (1995)
and Okten and Weisbrod (2000) further supported these findings. In
the case of Singapore, Wong et al. (1998) similarly found donations to
be sensitive to the price of providing a dollar’s worth of output.
With the above discussion in mind, we can now examine how
membership in a united charity (such as the Community Chest of
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Singapore) may affect donations. Most important of all, a united
charity avoids excessive and possibly wasteful competition for funds
among charities. Rose-Ackerman (1982) argued that competition
between charities for donations tends to push fundraising shares to
very high levels, so that little money is actually spent on providing
extra output. Thus a united charity can help to economize fundraising
costs by reducing competition between the member charities, and
donors may give more since the funds are now more efficiently
spent. In terms of the price of donating a dollar’s worth of charitable
output, lowering fundraising costs reduces this price of giving and
thus tends to increase donations.
Access by a united charity, like the United Way, to the payroll
deduction system also significantly increases the convenience for a
donor and also lowers the price of giving. Hartley (2000) believes that
in the case of the United Way coercion has sometimes been used.
Similarly, Brilliant (1990) argued that contribution through deduc-
tions at the workplace might be against the spirit of true voluntary
giving. In contrast, Keating et al. (1981) believed that coercion has not
been used, but that employees often agree to contribute in order to
gain goodwill or approval of the employers. Whatever the reasons,
they imply a fundraising advantage for the united charity.
When information costs are taken into account, there are
further advantages in joining a united charity. Rose-Ackerman
(1980) argued that poor information about the value of a gift to society
deters giving if donors are risk-averse. Donors may try to seek out
information about various charities, but in practice this is often costly.
Thus some donors may prefer to give the difficult task of allocation of
funds among charities to someone else. Since the united charity is
responsible for monitoring the activities of its members, some quality
control is assured.
Studies have also suggested that characteristics such as the age
and size of the organization also affect the volume of giving. Weisbrod
and Dominguez (1986) argued that age might be a proxy for the trust
and goodwill accumulated by the organization over time. Age may also
be positively related to the efficiency of fundraising, if it affects the
donor’s perception of output quality.3 As for size, there may be
3 As Okten and Weisbrod (2000) pointed out, there are exceptions. Older
organizations may have greater wealth, and individuals may prefer to give to
charities with less wealth. Also, younger organizations may be perceived to be
less tradition-bound and to have a more contemporary focus in their provision
of services.
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significant economies of scale in producing the public good itself.
Andreoni (1998) noted that provision of some charitable goods
involves high fixed costs – for example, due to the need for expensive
capital equipment and new buildings. In such a situation, sufficiently
large ‘seed grants’ or ‘leadership gifts’ may be necessary to get the
charitable activity started. Also, as suggested by Weinblatt (1992),
there may be economies in fundraising. Large organizations may
find it easier to raise funds because they are perceived to be trustwor-
thier than smaller ones. Donors may also believe larger organizations
to be more tightly administered and subject to more rigorous public
control so that funds are less likely to be misused. Thus young and
not-so-established organizations having difficulty in getting funds
may wish to join a united fund. Similarly, for a new charity having
difficulty in obtaining ‘seed money’, Rose-Ackerman (1980) argued
that the best chance of getting started is to operate under an existing
united fund.
There is, however, one important disadvantage in giving to a
united charity. Donors can determine the total amounts donated but
not how they are allocated among charities. Fisher (1977) envisaged
the united charity as a monopoly engaged in a tied-in sale. While the
price of giving tends to be pushed down by avoiding duplicative
fundraising activities, thus resulting in a saving of solicitation costs,
if donors care only for particular charities, the price of giving to these
charities may actually increase since donors have to contribute to
various charities in the proportions determined by the united charity.
He further argued that even if donors are allowed to earmark their
donations for particular charities, their actions could be offset by the
united charity in the distribution of the non-earmarked donations. If
donors perceive that they cannot ultimately affect the allocation of
their gifts, they may lower their donations to the combined charity.
Bilodeau (1992) suggested that if total donations fall as a result, the
optimal strategy for the united charity would involve trading off a
more desirable mix of services for higher contributions. It may want
to guarantee donors that their earmarked contributions will not be
offset completely.
While most of the models described previously assume that
individuals give in order to increase the supply of the public good, in
the recent literature there has also been much emphasis on the
private benefits to the donor through giving. Andreoni (1989, 1990)
argued that in giving, the individual may not just demand more
provision of the public good (charitable output), but at the same
time may get private good benefits from the gift per se, like a warm
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glow. In other words, the individual derives utility or internal satis-
faction from the act of giving itself. In addition to this warm-glow
effect, Harbaugh (1998) emphasized the prestige to the donors when
the amounts of their donations are made public. Glazer and Konrad
(1996) regarded donations as a means of signaling the donor’s wealth
to his peer groups and other people. Others have mentioned other
private benefits from giving such as social approval and goodwill. All
these possible motives for giving need to be considered in designing
policies to encourage private giving.
3 Organization objectives and decision to join a united
charity
The preceding discussion suggests that a charity may want to
join a united charity if the latter has fundraising advantages. On the
other hand, a charity that is able to attract enough donations on its
own or has significant alternative sources of revenue might be less
eager to join. But ultimately, a charity will not join a united fund
unless the charity manager believes that it will benefit from member-
ship, and thus it is necessary to understand the objectives of charity
managers. Typically, a charity has an ideology which is reflected, for
example, in the type and mix of services being produced and in their
distribution among beneficiaries. But since the charity has to break even,
what is involved is a trade-off between financial health and the prefer-
ence of the charity manager. One important implication is that different
sources of revenue will not be equally preferred, since some sources will
lead to more conflict with the manager’s objectives than the others.
Rose-Ackerman (1987) analyzed a possible conflict between the
wishes of donors and those of charity managers. Managers are
assumed to have a strong philosophical and professional commitment
to their service mix. Thus an increase in untied government grants to
a charity will cause it to reduce fundraising activities and costly
solicitation of donors who do not completely share the managerial
goals. Conversely, a reduction in government support will cause a
charity to pay closer attention to donors’ wishes.
Weisbrod (1998 a) regarded the nonprofit organization as pursu-
ing a social mission,4 and thus any activity that detracts from that
mission generates disutility to the organization. It is viewed as a
4 The detailed model is presented in Schiff and Weisbrod (1991).
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multi-product firm producing three goods. The first, which comprises
the organization’s mission, is often a collective good – for example,
services to the poor – that cannot be sold in private markets. The
second is a private good that is incidentally related to the primary
mission and thus generates user fees. The third is a private good that
is unrelated or ‘ancillary’ to the primary mission and is produced
solely for the generation of revenue. In this framework, the firm is
not indifferent between different sources of revenue. The preferred
revenue source is unsolicited donations, because they are without
restrictions and do not distract the firm from its mission by other
activities. The same argument goes for untied government grants and
untied endowment income. But in practice, government grants often
have strings attached that may cause the firm’s activities to diverge
from its mission. The second type of revenue, user fees, may be
disadvantageous because they may price out those people the firm’s
mission is intended to benefit. The last source, generating income
from ancillary activities, is disliked by the firm and is undertaken
just to generate revenue.
It is necessary to note that obtaining more revenue from one
source may affect, positively or negatively, revenues from other
sources, and moreover, the causation can be both ways.5 In this
respect, Weisbrod (1998 b) noted that with the recent decline in
government support, there has been increasing commercialization of
nonprofits in the United States. But greater revenue from commercial
sales in turn may influence future government support, as well as
affect private donations. Just as in the case of government grants,
greater commercial revenue tends to crowd out private donations. But
as noted earlier, commercial activities also cause the firm to change
the focus of its activities, and depending on the perceptions of donors,
may either increase or decrease donations. For example, the donors
may see commercial sales as evidence of self-help. Also, Cornes and
Sandler (1984) argued that the sale of private goods might be seen by
donors as a way to finance the general operation of the charity or to
cross-subsidize its public (charitable) output. In such cases donations
may in fact increase.
What are the implications of the above on the decision to join a
united charity? In its activities, a charity strives to achieve a proper
balance between financial viability and freedom to pursue its own
objectives. As Rose-Ackerman (1982) noted, the main advantage of a
5 The interdependencies between different sources of revenue can be
highly intricate. See Segal and Weisbrod (1998) for a more detailed discussion.
UNITED CHARITIES AND FUNDRAISING IN SINGAPORE 441
#CIRIEC 2003
united charity lies in providing funds at a relatively low cost for a
relatively ideologically homogeneous group of charities. Thus organ-
izations lacking the ability to raise enough donations on their own, or
new and relatively unknown organizations having difficulty in getting
started, may want to seek membership in a united fund, as long as the
latter’s ideology and preferences do not differ too greatly from those of
the charity managers.
But membership in a united charity also imposes costs on a
charity. The charity’s activities are subject to monitoring, and it
may be required to move closer to the ideology and preferences of
the united charity. All these may be viewed as a loss or reduction of
independence or autonomy of the organization. The costs would be
especially high for a charity whose ideology and preference for output
type and mix diverge substantially from those of the united charity. If
such a charity is unable to attract sufficient donations to finance its
programs, then it would have little choice but to carefully weigh the
net benefit from membership against resorting to other revenue
sources (such as users charges and commercial sales), as these may
also cause a charity to deviate from its central mission.
Of course, this consideration will be less important if the char-
ity, due to a variety of reasons – such as ideology, spiritual or religious
belief, or its particular line of activity – is able to attract regular
donations from a specific group of donors. For example, Rose-
Ackerman (1980) observed that some organizations have achieved a
reputation (or become a symbol of quality) for a particular activity
and thus are able to appeal to an ‘easy-to-identify’ group of donors,
and such organizations will have less need to join a united charity.
Organizations of another kind that would prefer not to join are those
whose ideologies and beliefs may actually cause controversy among
significant segments of the population. In such cases, the united
charity is also unlikely to seek their membership.
4 Empirical study for Singapore
As a united charity, the Community Chest of Singapore enjoys
considerable fundraising advantages the most important of which is
perhaps its access to the payroll deduction system through the
SHARE program, a program that has the support of many firms and
employers who encourage a high participation rate among their
employees. Scale economies in fundraising and its tax deductibility
(IPC) status also increase its appeal as a conduit for channeling
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individual donations to charities. But the inability of donors to
influence the distribution of donations among charities because
earmarking is ineffective may nullify some of these advantages. Also,
fundraising advantages alone may not be sufficient to induce member-
ship if it also involves a loss in autonomy by charity managers.
In a project funded by the National University of Singapore, we
collected and analyzed data from the financial accounts of some 72
VWOs, of which 31 are members of the Community Chest and 41 are
non-members. In what follows, we present our findings on the pos-
sible motives of organizations in joining the Community Chest. Then
we look at non-members to see why they may not want to join.
4.1 Motives of organizations in joining the Community Chest
We noted that one main reason for joining the Community
Chest is that this might result in lower fundraising costs per dollar
of donation raised. Unfortunately, we cannot test this hypothesis
directly for Community Chest members since they are not allowed
to engage in independent fundraising activities. Thus we have to rely
on indirect indications. Our main hypotheses are the following. First,
if funding and financial considerations underlie the main motive to
become members, then we would expect organizations that experience
deficits to wish to join. Second, organizations that do not have deficits
but face worsening financial positions may similarly wish to join.
Lastly, some organizations may not have financial difficulties, but
they may either anticipate higher expenditures in the future, or
they may want to undertake some medium term programs that their
present financial resources do not permit. These organizations may
also wish to join.
Table 1 lists the 31 member organizations included in the analy-
sis according to one of three groupings: those that experienced
deficits in the year they joined – or one or two years before they joined
– the Community Chest (Group I), those that showed signs of worsen-
ing financial positions (such as dwindling surpluses or developing
deficits) at the time (or just before) they joined the Community
Chest (Group II), and those that show none of these characteristics
(Group III). In this table, we also identify the service type of each
member organization.6 The results are striking. Of the 31 member
6 Briefly, organizations are classified into four service types: children,
youth and family services (CYF), services for the aged (A), services for the
disabled (D), and health and community related services (HC).
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Table 1 – List of member organizations of the Community Chest in the
study, classified according to financial position at the time of joining
Organization Service type
Group I. Organizations experiencing a deficit at the time of joining the Community Chest
1 Ang Mo Kio Social Service CYF/A
2 Bukit Ho Swee Social Service CYF/A
3 Children’s Aid Society CYF
4 HELP Family Service Centre CYF
5 Malay Youth Literary Association CYF
6 TRANS Centre CYF
7 Tampines Family Service Centre CYF
8 Grace Lodge A
9 Phor Kark See Home A
10 Asian Women’s Welfare Association D/A/CYF
11 Bizlink D
12 Cannosian School for the Hearing Impaired D
13 Spastic Children’s Association of Singapore D
14 Singapore Leprosy Relief Association D
15 Counselling and Care Centre HC/CYF
16 Diabetic Society of Singapore HC
17 Singapore After-Care Association HC
Group II. Organizations experiencing a worsening financial position at the time of joining
18 Students Care Service CYF
19 Sree Narayana Mission A
20 Society for the Aged Sick A
21 Tai Pei Old People’s Home A
22 Association for Educationally Subnormal Children D
23 MINDS D
24 The Singapore Cheshire Home D
25 Sun-Dac Centre for the Disabled D
26 Samaritans of Singapore HC
27 Singapore Association for Mental Health HC
Group III. Organizations showing no sign of financial difficulties at the time of joining
28 Ramakrishna Mission CYF
29 Young Women’s Muslim Association CYF
30 Singapore Association for the Deaf D
31 Singapore Association for the Visually Handicapped D
Abbreviations are as follows: CYF¼ children, youth and family services; A¼ services
for the aged (elderly); D¼ services for the disabled; HC¼health and community
services.
Note: Organizations in Group I are those that experienced deficits in the year they
joined the Community Chest, or one or two years before they joined the Community
Chest. Organizations in Group II are those that showed signs of worsening financial
positions – such as dwindling surpluses or developing deficits – at the time (or just
before) they joined the Community Chest. Organizations in Group III showed none of
these characteristics.
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organizations, 17 experienced deficits around the time they joined the
Community Chest, and another 10 experienced worsening financial
positions. Only 4 organizations show no financial difficulties at the
time of joining.
For illustrative purposes, Table 2 provides a more detailed
account of the financial positions of 6 selected organizations over the
period 1980 through 1998, 3 from the Group I organizations and 3
from the Group II organizations. These 6 organizations were selected
because they clearly bring out the defining characteristics of the two
groups of organizations in question.7 For each organization we show
three data series over time. Column (1) shows the ratio of total income
to total expenditure. Thus a value greater than 1 implies a surplus,
while a value less than 1 implies a deficit. Total income is defined as
the sum of donations, grants, fundraising income, investment income,
program fees, membership fees, income from sales, funds received
from the Community Chest, and other income, while total expend-
iture is the sum of manpower and operating expenses and deprecia-
tion. Column (2) shows the annual percentage increase in total
expenditure. It is in real terms as the expenditure data have been
deflated. Under our reasoning, some organizations may join the
Community Chest because they anticipate higher expenditures in
the future or they need more financial resources to engage in some
medium term programs. In such cases, we expect their expenditures
to have a sudden jump or show a rising trend after they join the
Community Chest. Column (3) shows the amount of funds received
from the Community Chest as a fraction of total income, and is meant
to indicate the dependence of the organization on the Community
Chest for funding. For each organization, the figures for the year in
which the organization joined the Community Chest are underscored.
For the Group I organizations highlighted, all 3 organizations
experienced deficits prior to membership in the Community Chest.
For the Spastic Children’s Association of Singapore, the situation
turned from surplus to deficit in the year prior to joining. Here, it
appeared that high rates of growth of total expenditure, as reflected in
Column 2, led to a deficit around the time it became a member. For
the other 2 organizations, Counselling and Care Centre and the
Singapore After-Care Association, both were experiencing deficits or
just barely breaking even a number of years prior to and up till the time
of joining. Both have been able to increase their total expenditure
7 It would be too lengthy to present results of all the individual
organizations. Full details are available upon request.
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Table 2 – Analysis of financial positions of selected member organizations of the Community Chest
I. Organizations experiencing deficits at the time of joining the Community Chest
Spastic Children’s Association of Singapore (D) Counselling and Care Centre (HC/CYF) Singapore After-Care Association (HC)
Total
income/
total
expenditure
Percent
change in
Real
expenditure
Chest
funding/
total
income
Total
income/
total
expenditure
Percent
change in
real
expenditure
Chest
funding/
Total
income
Total
income/
total
expenditure
Percent
change
in real
expenditure
Chest
funding/
total
income
Year (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
1980 1.047 – 0.000 0.942 – 0.000 1.026 – 0.000
1981 1.348 9.17 0.000 0.808 59.33 0.000 0.530 4.01 0.000
1982 1.360 19.34 0.000 1.005 31.27 0.000 0.948 13.05 0.000
1983 1.150 8.13 0.000 0.862 23.26 0.000 0.756 12.55 0.000
1984 1.069 14.52 0.000 1.161 76.27 0.462 1.235 19.15 0.147
1985 0.692 61.33 0.000 1.189 30.98 0.706 0.888 55.21 0.643
1986 1.268 34.37 0.760 0.946 0.53 0.547 0.523 4.70 0.000
1987 1.343 8.26 0.683 1.034 13.39 0.583 1.286 1.93 0.275
1988 0.879 11.85 0.740 1.197 4.57 0.595 1.015 10.37 0.740
1989 1.033 0.70 0.480 0.724 14.33 0.586 1.173 10.68 0.694
1990 1.601 30.52 0.627 0.945 27.09 0.632 0.791 13.89 0.716
1991 1.431 23.47 0.369 1.065 19.30 0.600 1.049 4.44 0.794
1992 0.863 10.03 0.353 0.901 3.80 0.570 1.077 1.38 0.800
1993 – – – – – – 0.925 25.32 0.842
1994 1.022 – 0.599 1.015 – 0.645 1.218 83.84 0.834
1995 0.973 1.49 0.692 1.067 2.22 0.701 1.005 599.32 0.872
1996 1.062 12.42 0.737 1.124 6.40 0.721 1.113 9.59 0.696
1997 1.067 4.28 0.686 0.939 7.38 0.681 – – –
1998 1.134 3.73 0.688 1.009 7.06 0.668 – – –
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Table 2 – Analysis of financial positions of selected member organizations of the Community Chest
II. Organizations of experiencing worsening financial positions at the time of joining
Singapore Association for Mental Health (HC) Students Care Service (CYF) The Singapore Cheshire Home (D)
Year
Total
income/
total
expenditure
Percent
change in
Real
expenditure
Chest
funding/
total income
Total
income/
total
expenditure
Percent
change in
real
expenditure
Chest
funding/
total income
Total
income/
total
expenditure
Percent
change
in real
expenditure
Chest
funding/
total
income
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
1980 1.247 – 0.000 1.245 – 0.000 1.393 – 0.000
1981 1.359 41.83 0.000 1.226 0.86 0.000 2.313 5.42 0.000
1982 1.406 21.87 0.000 1.628 9.53 0.000 2.802 5.11 0.000
1983 1.002 13.45 0.000 1.095 26.68 0.000 1.174 31.77 0.000
1984 1.703 8.64 0.538 1.170 36.49 0.466 1.252 10.78 0.360
1985 1.230 8.73 0.529 1.339 2.12 0.745 1.223 27.49 0.328
1986 0.835 13.03 0.365 1.143 70.92 0.636 0.814 2.76 0.213
1987 0.963 1.91 0.557 1.106 33.18 0.711 0.952 4.26 0.354
1988 0.921 0.68 0.753 1.048 10.56 0.760 0.962 3.11 0.432
1989 1.276 7.07 0.667 0.807 13.02 0.783 0.903 7.33 0.429
1990 – – – 0.772 5.54 0.899 2.929 17.87 0.078
1991 0.848 – 0.684 – – – – – –
1992 1.103 37.23 0.888 – – – 0.762 – 0.023
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Table 2 – continued
Singapore Association for Mental Health (HC) Students Care Service (CYF) The Singapore Cheshire Home (D)
Year
Total
income/
total
expenditure
Percent
change in
Real
expenditure
Chest
funding/
total income
Total
income/
total
expenditure
Percent
change in
real
expenditure
Chest
funding/
total income
Total
income/
total
expenditure
Percent
change
in real
expenditure
Chest
funding/
total
income
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
1993 1.053 7.15 0.831 – – – 1.012 36.31 0.295
1994 0.954 42.67 0.850 – – – 1.009 13.58 0.244
1995 1.449 37.73 0.635 – – – 1.364 4.45 0.510
1996 0.329 63.79 0.000 – – – 0.939 7.81 0.368
1997 – – – – – – – – –
1998 0.286 – 0.000 – – – – – –
Source: The original data are obtained from audited accounts and annual reports of the various organizations. The symbol ‘‘–’’ indicates that data
or information is unavailable.
Note: For each organization, the figures for the year in which the organization joined the Community Chest are in italics. For each organization,
Column (1) shows the ratio of total income to total expenditure. Total income is calculated as the sum of donations, subventions, fundraising
income, investment income, program fees, membership fees, sales, funds received from the Community Chest, and other income. Column (2)
shows the percentage increase in real total expenditure from the previous year. Real total expenditure is obtained by deflating total expenditure by
the Consumer Price Index (October 1992–September 1993¼100). Total expenditure is the sum of manpower and operating expenses and
depreciation. Column (3) shows the amount of funds received from the Community Chest divided by total income.
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substantially after joining. For all 3 organizations, the ratio of
Community Chest funding to total income has also been consistently
high in the years following membership. Detailed analysis of the data
for the remaining 14 Group I organizations (data not presented in
Table 2) reveals a roughly similar pattern for these other organiza-
tions. Thus while one cannot be absolutely certain about the motives
of these organizations in joining the Community Chest, the evidence
strongly suggests that at least some of them had joined in order to
solve their deficit problems and to gain access to the Chest’s financial
resources.
Like all organizations listed in Group II, the 3 Group II organ-
izations highlighted did not experience any financial problems prior to
or at the time they joined the Community Chest, but their financial
positions seemed to have weakened substantially, as suggested by the
rapidly dwindling surpluses. For all 3 organizations, the Singapore
Association for Mental Health, the Students Care Service and the
Singapore Cheshire Home, the situation turned from large surpluses
to just approximately breakeven in the years just before they joined.
In addition, these 3 organizations experienced large increases in their
expenditures just before they joined. As argued earlier, those organ-
izations that see deficits beginning to develop, and those that want
additional resources to engage in new programs, also have an incen-
tive to become members of the Community Chest.
In a thesis supervised by the authors, Chan (1998) conducted a
series of interviews with some member organizations. Based on these
interviews, she confirmed that financial considerations were indeed
the most important in inducing membership. For instance, extremely
high overhead and operating costs in providing certain social services
– like services for the disabled – were identified by her as primary
reasons motivating membership.8 While the evidence suggests that
financial considerations are the most important in inducing organiza-
tions to seek membership, we recognize that there may be other
reasons for joining. As an example, new and small charitable organ-
izations often lack skill and experience, and because they are not well
established, they lack the manpower – especially professional staff
8 Running a special school for the disabled requires expensive teaching
materials and therapy equipment that are mostly imported. Thus most
organizations providing services for the disabled have joined the Community
Chest due to the expensive facilities needed to run the programs, and the bulk
of the Chest’s funds have been allocated to that sector.
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services – to carry out certain programs. Thus they join the Commu-
nity Chest to tap the latter’s expertise.
4.2 Analysis of non-members of the Community Chest
The Community Chest might have fundraising advantages, but
charities may not like having their activities monitored. Thus if,
for some reason, they are able to achieve as low – or even lower –
fundraising cost per dollar compared to the Community Chest, they
will have even less incentive to become members. For the Community
Chest, the norm has been to keep fundraising cost down to no more
than 20 cents per dollar raised. Thus organizations that are able to
achieve substantially lower fundraising cost than that may not benefit
by joining. Even when the fundraising cost is substantially higher,
organizations may avoid seeking membership if they are able to raise
sufficient funds for their programs despite their higher fund raising
cost.
In our project, we have been able to estimate the fundraising
cost per dollar raised for 41 non-member organizations over the
period 1994–1999. Table 3 presents the results with organizations
grouped according to service types. For organizations providing
more than one type of service, their names appear more than once.
For the years 1994 through 1998, the estimates in the table are based
on data obtained from the financial accounts and annual reports of
the organizations. The fundraising cost per dollar raised is estimated
by dividing fundraising costs by fundraising income. A figure of zero
implies either no fundraising activity in that year or that funds
received during the year are largely unsolicited donations. As can be
seen, there are gaps in the table because, for some organizations, we
are unable to locate their accounts for certain years. Thus for the year
1999, instead of relying on data from the financial accounts, we
obtained an independent set of estimates of fundraising cost per dollar
based on results from a survey conducted in 2000. Asterisks mark the
resulting estimates of fundraising cost per dollar for 1999 in Table 3.
The estimate of fundraising cost per dollar for 1999 is based on
the following reasoning. Total donations (D) may be regarded as the
sum of unsolicited donations (DU) and solicited donations (DS). Unsoli-
cited donations are assumed to have a fundraising cost of zero. Thus
if total fundraising cost is F, then fundraising cost per dollar (F/D)¼ (F/
DS)[1 (DU/D)], where F/DS is fundraising cost as a fraction of solicited
donations, and 1 (DU/D)¼DS/D is the ratio of solicited donations to
total donations. In the survey, we have asked the organizations
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Table 3 – Fundraising cost per dollar of funds raised for selected non-member organizations of the Community
Chest
Fundraising cost per dollar
Organization 1999 1998 1997 1996 1995 1994 Average Range
I. Services for the aged (A)
Adventist Home for the Elders – – – – 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Alzheimer’s Disease Association 0.07* – 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0–0.07
Apex Day Care Centre for the Elderly – 0.000 0.020 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 0–0.02
Bo Tien Welfare Services Society 0.25–0.30* – 0.000 – – – 0.125–0.15 0–0.3
Home Nursing Foundation 0.14–0.18* 0.14–0.18 0.14–0.18
Metta Welfare Association 0.20–0.25* – – – – – 0.20–0.25 0.20–0.25
Ren Ci Hospital 0.15–0.18* 0.078 0.137 – – – 0.122–0.132 0.078–0.18
The Salvation Army (General Fund) – 0.052 0.000 – 0.036 0.034 0.031 0–0.052
The Salvation Army (Social Fund) – 0.117 0.108 – 0.000 0.000 0.056 0–0.117
The Salvation Army (Property Fund) – 0.000 0.000 – 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Singapore Action Group of Elders 0.30–0.40*/0.216 0.267 – – 0.076 0.198 0.189 0.076–0.267
Singapore Christian Home for the Aged – 0.023 0.064 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.017 0–0.064
Society of St. Vincent De Paul – – – – 0.052 0.061 0.057 0.052–0.061
Young Women’s Christian Association
(all centers and national office)
0.20–0.24* – – 0.073 0.000 0.002 0.069–0.079 0–0.24
Average (A) 0.077 0.041 0.018 0.016 0.030
II. Services for the disabled (D)
Christian Outreach to the Handicapped – 0.011 0.062 0.063 0.092 0.035 0.053 0.011–0.092
Dyslexia Association 0.20–0.24* – – – – 0.000 0.10–0.12 0–0.24
Handicaps Welfare Association 0.13* – – – – – 0.129 0.129
Riding for the Disabled
Association of Singapore
0.06* – – – – – 0.060 0.060
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Table 3 – continued
Fundraising cost per dollar
Organization 1999 1998 1997 1996 1995 1994 Average Range
Singapore Association for the Deaf 0.00* 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Society for the Aid to the Paralysed 0.04–0.08* – – – – – 0.04–0.08 0.04–0.08
Young Men’s Christian Association – – – – – 0.507 0.507 0.507
Average (D) 0.006 0.031 0.032 0.046 0.136
III. Children Youth and Family Services (CYF)
Cheng Su Lan Methodist
Children’s Home
– – – 0.000 0.000 – 0.000 0.000
Children’s Charities Association 0.079 0.132 0.113 0.088 0.091 0.113 0.103 0.079–0.132
Dyslexia Association 0.20–0.24* – – – – 0.000 0.10–0.12 0–0.24
Federation of Youth Clubs – – – – 0.215 – 0.215 0.215
Methodist Welfare Services 0.25–0.30* – – – – – 0.25–0.30 0.25–0.30
The Salvation Army (General Fund) – 0.052 0.000 – 0.036 0.034 0.031 0–0.052
The Salvation Army (Social Fund) – 0.117 0.108 – 0.000 0.000 0.056 0–0.117
The Salvation Army (Property Fund) – 0.000 0.000 – 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Singapore Anglican Welfare Council 0.20–0.24* 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.033–0.04 0–0.24
Singapore Children’s Society 0.25–0.30* – – – – – 0.25–0.30 0.25–0.30
Singapore Indian
Development Association
– – – – 0.001 0.000 0.001 0–0.001
Society of St. Vincent De Paul – – – – 0.052 0.061 0.057 0.052–0.061
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Table 3 – continued
Fundraising cost per dollar
Organization 1999 1998 1997 1996 1995 1994 Average Range
Young Men’s Christian Association – – – – 0.507 0.507 0.507
Young Women’s Christian Association
(all centers and national office)
0.20–0.24* – – 0.073 0.000 0.002 0.069–0.079 0–0.24
Average (CYF) 0.060 0.044 0.040 0.040 0.072
IV. Health and Community Services (HC)
Assisi Home and Hospice – – – 0.005 0.006 – 0.006 0.005–0.006
Breakthrough Missions Limited 0.000* 0.000 0.000 – – – 0.000 0.000
Diabetic Society of Singapore 0.23–0.27* – 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.046–0.054 0–0.27
Kwong Wai Shiu Hospital 0.08–0.11* – – 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.02–0.275 0–0.11
National Kidney Foundation – 0.518 0.563 0.323 – 0.299 0.426 0.299–0.563
Ren Ci Hospital 0.15–0.18* 0.078 0.137 – – – 0.122–0.132 0.078–0.18
The Salvation Army (General Fund) – 0.052 0.000 – 0.036 0.034 0.031 0–0.052
The Salvation Army (Social Fund) – 0.117 0.108 – 0.000 0.000 0.056 0–0.117
The Salvation Army (Property Fund) – 0.000 0.000 – 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Sian Chay Medical Institution – 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
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Table 3 – continued
Fundraising cost per dollar
Organization 1999 1998 1997 1996 1995 1994 Average Range
Singapore Anglican Welfare Council 0.20–0.24* 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.033–0.04 0–0.24
Singapore Anti-Narcotics Association – 0.062 0.058 0.000 0.025 0.036 0.036 0–0.062
Singapore Anti-Tuberculosis Association 0.23–0.27* – – – – – 0.23–0.27 0.23–0.27
Singapore Cancer Society – 0.106 0.042 0.036 0.275 0.039 0.100 0.036–0.275
Singapore Detainees Aftercare Association – 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Singapore Thong Chai Medical Institution – – 0.249 0.000 0.015 0.000 0.066 0–0.249
St. Andrew’s Mission Hospital 0.14–0.18* – – – – 0.000 0.07–0.09 0–0.18
Turning Point 0.35* – – – – – 0.350 0.350
Average (HC) 0.085 0.089 0.036 0.030 0.031
Sources: (i) Audited accounts and annual reports of the various organizations, (ii) survey and interviews conducted in 2000. The symbol ‘‘–’’
indicates that data or information is unavailable.
Note: The table shows the fundraising cost per dollar of funds raised for various organizations classified according to service types. If an
organization provides more than one service, its name appears under all those service type it provides. The fundraising cost per dollar is
estimated by dividing fundraising costs by fundraising income. Interest income and investment income are not included in the calculation of
fundraising income. The figures for fundraising cost per dollar for the years 1994 to 1998 are estimated in this manner using data from the
audited accounts and annual reports of the organizations. For 1999, the figures marked with asterisks (*) are obtained directly from the results
of interviews conducted with the organizations in 2000, while those without asterisks are obtained by the method described earlier. For each
organization, the average and range for fundraising cost per dollar over the 1994–1999 period are also shown. Note that for an organization
giving fundraising cost per dollar as a range in the survey, the average for the period is itself shown as a range. An average is also calculated
for each service type.
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to provide an estimate of F/DS based on their various fundraising
events such as flag days, fund fairs, carnivals, gala dinners, concerts
and so on. We have also asked them to provide an estimate of the
percentage of their donations that are unsolicited. From this inform-
ation, we calculated the fundraising cost per dollar for 1999. Note that
in most cases the estimates are presented as a range since most organ-
izations were unable to give precise figures. In Table 3 we have also
shown the average and range of fundraising cost per dollar for each
organization over 1994–1999. It should be noted that the 1999 esti-
mates are actually not directly comparable to those of earlier years
since they are based on a different methodology. For each year, an
average has also been calculated for each service type.
The general impression we get from Table 3 is that for most
organizations, the fundraising cost per dollar over the years have been
substantially below the 20 cents benchmark of the Community Chest. In
fact, for some organizations, fundraising cost has been rather insignifi-
cant. This may be explained by the high percentage of unsolicited dona-
tions. For example, in our survey, organizations like the Alzheimer’s
Disease Association andRiding for theDisabled reported that 80 percent
of their donations are unsolicited. Not surprisingly, these organizations
have very low figures for fundraising cost per dollar. Even for organiza-
tions with fundraising cost higher than the benchmark, usually the
differences are not great. There are a few exceptions, including the
National Kidney Foundation and the Young Men’s Christian Associa-
tion, though for the latter the estimate is based ononly one year. Asnoted
earlier, some organizations may have achieved a reputation in their
particular lines of activity and thus are able to appeal to a well-defined
group of donors, who may continue to contribute regularly despite high
fundraising cost. These few exceptions aside, the general picture is clear
when we look at the averages across organizations for each service type.
For all the four types of social services, the figures for average fundraising
cost per dollar are well below the benchmark of 20 cents per dollar. Thus
a significant number of organizations can do at least as well as the
Community Chest in fundraising. For these organizations, therefore,
the fundraising advantages of the Community Chest are a non-issue in
their decision not to seek membership in the Community Chest.
In order to have a better understanding of the non-members’
opinions of the Community Chest, a part of our survey asked ques-
tions as to their reasons for not joining the Community Chest and
whether they intend to join the Community Chest in the future. 21
organizations responded to this part of the survey and the results are
presented in Table 4.
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It should be emphasized that in the personal interviews, no
attempt had been made to suggest possible answers and those inter-
viewed were simply asked to state freely their opinions. The results
are quite striking. Of the 21 organizations, 14 stated that they did not
join the Community Chest because they want greater autonomy in
their operation, and 5 mentioned that not being a member enables
greater flexibility in raising funds. Five organizations stated explicitly
that they dislike the monitoring of their activities should they become
members. Ten organizations stated that they do not need to join
because they are able to raise sufficient funds by themselves. Other
reasons for not joining include the religious or spiritual beliefs of the
organization and so on. It is interesting to note that one or two
organizations viewed the Community Chest as part of the govern-
ment, and believed that people would cease to give to them if they
become members. As for whether non-members would like to join in
the future, only 4 said that they might consider joining, while 8 said
Table 4 – Analysis of non-member organizations’ perception of the
Community Chest
Responses to survey Number of organizations
Reasons for not joining the Community Chest
Greater autonomy in organization’s activities 14
Greater flexibility in raising funds 6
Organization able to raise sufficient funds by itself 10
Dislikes monitoring of organization’s activities 5
Refused membership by the Community Chest
(inability to meet the Chest’s criteria)
1
Other reasons
Organization’s ideology or spiritual belief 2
Organization’s service type not emphasized
by the Community Chest
2
Desire to remain as a private organization 1
Has stable sources of income/funds from other sources 2
Organization’s View of the Community Chest
Organization may consider joining the Community Chest 4
Organization will not join the Community Chest 8
Organization has been approached
to join the Community Chest
2
Believes in fundraising advantage of the Community Chest 5
The Community Chest has a ‘‘government’’ image 2
Does not understand how the Community Chest operates 1
Source: Survey and interviews conducted in 2000
Note: 21 organizations responded to this part of the survey.
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explicitly that they would not join. Despite this result, it is interesting
to note that 5 organizations believed that joining the Community
Chest would help them to get more funds.
To sum up, the results based on our analysis of financial data
and survey firmly support what economic theories would predict.
Joining the Community Chest may help its members secure more
financial resources. But some organizations may regard autonomy
and independence as important and dislike monitoring of their activ-
ities. Thus they prefer to remain as non-members, at least as long as
they can raise enough funds on their own to remain self-sufficient.
5 Policy implications and conclusions
The National Council of Social Service (NCSS) and the Commu-
nity Chest have played an important role in furthering the cause of
social service provision in Singapore with the Community Chest
serving as a centralized fundraising body for its members. The find-
ings of this paper suggest that the fundraising advantages of the
Chest are well recognized by its members as well as by non-member
organizations. Thus organizations experiencing a deficit or financial
difficulty might become members in order to gain access to the
Chest’s financial resources. Similarly, organizations seeking
additional funds to expand their programs, or new organizations in
need of seed money may also want to join.
While the Community Chest and VWOs have been largely
successful in raising funds for the provision of social services, in
recent years, donations did not appear to be increasing sufficiently
to meet the rising needs. In the case of donations to the Community
Chest, one possible reason may be that much of the giving is already
institutionalized under the SHARE Program, which now contributes
about 40 percent to total donations received. In many companies,
employee participation rates are already very high. Thus unless workers
can be persuaded to increase their pledges and unless the set of
participating companies can be enlarged, not much increase in
donations can be expected from this source.
With greater sophistication of donors, there is increasing
demand by donors to know where their donations have gone. Thus
to attract more donations, it is necessary to convince donors that their
money is fruitfully spent and not wasted on unnecessary administra-
tion and advertising costs. The NCSS is mindful of this and has
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repeatedly emphasized that all such costs incurred by the Community
Chest are sponsored by Singapore Pools, so that every dollar donated
will benefit, in full, someone in need. But since donations from
Singapore Pools could alternatively be used for the provision of social
services, ultimately it is important to convince donors that VWOs are
well managed. The recent push by NCSS to promote greater profes-
sionalism in the social service sector, a move that will hopefully
increase productivity and performance in that sector is a step in the
right direction. This will help erase some doubts from the minds of
donors and reassure them that they are getting value for their dona-
tions. However, the issue of greater donor sovereignty over the use of
their contributions has yet to be addressed.
Other than providing price incentives for giving and promoting
greater efficiency in VWOs, other measures to encourage donations
are also suggested by this paper. We have seen that individuals may
derive private benefits from donations. Charities, for example, may
appeal to the warm-glow effect by highlighting the plight of the under-
privileged and the need for improvement of their welfare. We have
also seen that donors may gain prestige and social approval from
giving. This consideration is especially relevant for large donors and
corporate givers. For the latter, contributing actively to a social cause
could enhance the firm’s public image and augment the loyalty and
goodwill of its stakeholders: customers, employees and shareholders
alike. Thus greater recognition of donors’ contributions through
announcement and awards can help promote giving. Such awards
have in fact been given by the Community Chest and should be
further encouraged.
Finally, on the issue of whether the Community Chest will evolve
into a monopoly fundraising agency for all charities in Singapore, we
note that, as at present, all proposals by member organizations are
reviewed and approved by the NCSS before they can be funded by the
Community Chest. Thus proposals that do not fit the priorities and
preferences of the NCSS may not receive funding. In this light, despite
its edge in fundraising, the idea of a Community Chest serving as a
monopoly fundraising agency for all charities is an unattractive one.
Diversity will suffer and some services, particularly those supporting
less popular causes, may not be able to survive. Here, it is gratifying to
note that the empirical analysis of this paper suggests that such a
scenario is unlikely. The membership of the Community Chest has not
increased in recent years. Many non-member organizations have
fundraising costs as low, if not lower, than those of the Community
Chest. In addition, these organizations may have large unsolicited
458 VINCENT C.H. CHUA & CHUNG MING WONG
#CIRIEC 2003
contributions from donors who identify with their cause, or they have
significant alternative sources of income. These agencies regard auto-
nomy and independence as important and thus are unlikely to seek
membership in the Chest. Thus the present situation – in which the
Community Chest plays a major role in raising funds at relatively low
cost for its members, while at the same time a significant number of
charities remain as non-members – may in fact represent some kind of
equilibrium in the social service sector. It may even be a desirable
situation – one in which excessive competition for funds is avoided,
while at the same time some diversity in ideology and output is retained
in the social service sector
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Le roˆle des organisations caritatives unies dans la collecte de
fonds : le cas de Singapour
La the´orie sugge`re qu’une organisation caritative unie contribue a`
re´duire les couˆts de collecte de fonds en diminuant la concurrence
dans la recherche de donateurs entre les organisations caritatives
membres. Ne´anmoins, souvent, les donateurs ne peuvent pas
controˆler l’affectation de leurs dons et les organisations caritatives
peuvent ne pas appre´cier le controˆle de leurs activite´s. L’article
examine ces questions ainsi que d’autres lie´es a` la Communaute´ Chest
de Singapour. Les re´sultats, base´s sur une analyse de la situation
financie`re et des couˆts de collecte de fonds d’un grand nombre
d’organisations caritatives, sugge`rent que la Communaute´ Chest
posse`de d’importants avantages pour la collecte de fonds. Donc, les
organisations caritatives en difficulte´ financie`re ou en demande de
fonds pour de nouveaux programmes ont tendance a` rechercher de
nouveaux membres. Cependant, les organisations qui accordent
beaucoup de valeur a` leur inde´pendance et autonomie et qui parviennent
a` re´duire leurs couˆts de collecte de fonds ont tendance a` ne pas devenir
membres. De`s lors une agence monopolistique re´coltant des fonds
pour toutes les organisations caritatives est improbable dans le cas de
Singapour.
Die Rolle vereinigter Wohlta¨tigkeitsorganisationen bei der
Aufbringung von Geldmitteln: der Fall Singapur
Die Theorie besagt, dass eine vereinigte Wohlta¨tigkeitsorganisation
hilfreich sein kann, um die Kosten der Aufbringung von Geldmitteln
durch Verringerung des Wettbewerbs unter den angeschlossenen
Wohlta¨tigkeitsorganisationen zu senken. Allerdings ko¨nnen Spender
oft nicht die Allokation ihrer Zuwendungen kontrollieren, und den
Wohlta¨tigkeitsorganisationen mag die U¨berwachung ihrer Aktivita¨ten
unlieb sein. Dieser Beitrag untersucht diese und andere Fragen am
Beispiel der Community Chest von Singapur. Die Ergebnisse, die auf
der Analyse von Finanzpositionen und Kosten der Aufbringung der
Geldmittel bei einer großen Zahl von Wohlta¨tigkeitsorganisationen
basieren, zeigen, dass die Community Chest u¨ber bedeutende Vorteile
bei der Aufbringung von Geldmitteln verfu¨gt. Deshalb tendieren
Wohlta¨tigkeitsorganisationen, die sich in finanziellen Schwierigkeiten
befinden oder die Geldmittel fu¨r zusa¨tzliche Programme beno¨tigen,
dazu, die Mitgliedschaft zu beantragen. Andererseits tendieren
Organisationen, die ihre Autonomie und Unabha¨ngigkeit scha¨tzen
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und die in der Lage sind, Geldmittel zu niedrigen Kosten aufzubringen
dazu, nicht die Mitgliedschaft zu erwerben. Deshalb ist eine
Monopolagentur zur Aufbringung von Geldmitteln fu¨r alle
Wohlta¨tigkeitsorganisationen im Falle Singapurs fu¨r die Zukunft
unwahrscheinlich.
El papel de las organizaciones caritativas unidas en la colecta de
fondos: el caso de Singapur
La teorı´a sugiere que una organizacio´n caritativa unida contribuye a
reducir los costes de la colecta de fondos, disminuyendo la competencia
en la bu´squeda de donantes entre las organizaciones caritativas
miembros. No obstante, frecuentemente, los donantes no pueden
controlar la afectacio´n de sus donativos y las organizaciones caritativas
pueden no apreciar el control de sus actividades. El artı´culo examina
estas cuestiones, ası´ como otras relacionadas con la Comunidad Chest
de Singapur. Los resultados, obtenidos a partir de un ana´lisis de la
situacio´n financiera y de los costes de la colecta de fondos de un gran
nu´mero de organizaciones caritativas, ponen de manifiesto que la
Comunidad Chest posee importantes ventajas para la colecta de fondos.
Ası´ pues, las organizaciones caritativas con dificultades financieras o
que demandan fondos para nuevos programas tienen tendencia a buscar
nuevos miembros. Sin embargo, las organizaciones que conceden mucho
valor a su independencia y autonomı´a y que consiguen controlar sus
costes de colecta de fondos tienen tendencia a no convertirse en
miembros. Por lo tanto, en el caso de Singapur es muy improbable que
llegue a existir una agencia monopolı´stica que recolecte fondos para
todas las organizaciones caritativas.
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